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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CteeNo. 
13849 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This appeal concerns the legality of a driver's license 
revocation by the appelant under Utah's Implied Con-
sent Law, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), as 
amended. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On January 2§, 1974, the appellant revoked the ra-
spondent's license to drive for the latter's aleged failure 
to submit to a sobriety test under Utah Code Ann. § 41-
JOHN ROLFE GASSMAN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, Driver 
license Division, Department of Pub-
lic Safety, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
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6-44.10 (1953), as amended, said revocation to be for one 
year commending January 3, 1974. Pursuant to the pro-
visions of said act, respondent through his attorney, 
sought a trial de novo in the District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, filed on the 25th day of February, 
1974, and obtained from Third District Judge Stewart 
M. Hanson, a stay on the revocation pending the hearing 
de novo, on the question of whether respondent's license 
was subject to revocation. The case was heard before 
the Honorable Jay E. Banks on June 19, 1974. Judge 
Banks found that resipondent did not unreasonably re-
fuse to suibmit to a sobriety test but did in feet request 
a blood alcohol test. Consequently, Judge Banks ruled 
that the petition of the respondent to set aside the revo-
cation under administrative hearing be granted, and that 
the respondent be ordered reinstated to his driving privi-
leges as if the same had never been revoked, and that 
any and all references to said revocation from respon-
dent's driving record be deleted by appellant. This order 
of Third District Judge Jay E. Banks was entered and 
filed of record on September 5, 1974. 
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS PROCEEDING 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's order 
of September 5, 1974, ordering the restoration of respon-
dent's license and seeks an order in harmony with appel-
lant's prior order of revocation. Respondent would have 
this court affirm the lower court's decision. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 22,1973, at approximately 10200 South 
State Street at approximately 12:45 o'clock a.m., Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Arlo Wilkinson, stopped and 
arrested respondent, John Rolfe Gassman (R. 23, 24). 
Prior to the arost,, the Trooper had respondent perform 
some field agility tests, one of which he did fairly well 
and the others; Which the Trooper did not feel were sat-
isfactory (R. 24, 25). Subsequent to the arrest, the 
Trooper advised respondent of his constitutional rights 
(all of V from Exhibit S-l), and also of his rights under 
the Implied Consent law by reading to him all of VI 
from Exhibit S-l which contained the information from 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), as amended (R. 
25, 26). The Trooper testified that he thereafter asked, 
"Mr. Gassman, what is your response to my request that 
you submit to a dhemical test?" and his response was 
in these words: "Yes, I will take a blood test. Also I 
want my physician to be there." Thereafter, the trooper 
called the dispatcher while yet in the patrol vehicle and 
finding the name of respondent's physician to be LaVere 
Poulsen at the Granger Clinic discovered that he was 
not on call but that Dr. Foulsen's brother,, Jerry Poulsen, 
was (R. 27). On discovering this fact, Mr. Gassman 
refused the use of Dr. Jerry Poulsen, saying "No way 
do I want him to take my blood" (R. 27, 37). Prior to 
this time the Trooper had made it clear to the respon-
dent that his physician could take a test in addition (em-
phasis ours) to the one that the trooper requested him 
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to take (R. 36, lines 9 and 10). Respondent and the 
trooper proceeded to jail. At the jail the trooper advised 
the respondent that he would try to call Dr. Paulsen's 
answering service to see what response could be obtained, 
and discovered from a Mrs. Beverly Simpson that "he 
(meaning Dr. LaVere Poulsen) is not available. I don't 
even know where he is at. I cannot locate him." The 
trooper hung up from calling the Granger Clinic and 
advised Mr. Gassman that they could not locate his doc-
tor (R. 29). Upon being advised again that Dr. Poulsen's 
brother Jerry was available, Mr. Gassman, the respon-
dent, said "No way do I want Jerry." The respondent 
did not further attempt to get hold of Dr. LaVere Pfoul-
sen saying that if the officer could not reach him certainly 
the respondent could not (R. 30). 
Thereafter, the trooper said to respondent, "Let's 
forget a blood test for a moment. He(re is the breath-
alyzer in the other room. Will you come in and take the 
breath test?" To this the respondent said, "No I will 
not. No, no." Subsequent to that, the trooper said, 
"Okay," and thereafter shoddy left the jail (R. 30, 37, 
38). The respondent verified that he had been asked 
to take a breathalyzer (R. 45), and further that he un-
derstood that Trooper Wilkinson would be administering 
it (R. 45). Respondent further verified that the trooper 
was at the jail sometime, probably a half hour (R. 45, 
lines 12 and 13). The respondent expressed on direct 
testimony from his attorney, Mr. Blackham, that he 
thought Trooper Wilinkson was not an impartial witness 
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to administer the breath test (R. 45, 46). The respon-
dent acknowledged, however, under cross-examination 
that he knew a number of doctors in the community (R. 
46). The respondent further acknowledged that there 
was not any particular reason when Dr. LaVere Poulsen 
was unavailable that he did not designate some other 
doctor, and did admit that he did not suggest any other 
physician when he refused to let Dr. Jerry Foulsem,, the 
brother, be contacted (R. 46, 47). 
The respondent further acknowledged that he was 
read the entire Implied Consent Law and that he had 
never previously taken a breathalyzer test. Trooper Wil-
kinson took approximately 15 mintues or more attempting 
to contact Dr. LaVere Poulsen and estimated that he 
lelt the jail at approximately 2:15 o'clock a.m. as he 
arrived at home at 3:00 o'clock a.m. (R. 30). The testi-
mony was unrebutted that Trooper Wilkinson told the 
respondent ait the jail that he could lose his license for 
a year if he did not take either the breath or the blood 
test (R. 31, 32, 38). The normal time for Trooper Wil-
kinson to be off shift that particular day was 1:00 o'clock 
a.m. (R. 32). 
At no time did the respondent request to call an 
attorney. A phone was made available and was available 
during the entire time they were in the jail (R. 31). At 
no time subsequent to leaving the jail did Trooper Wil-
kinson receive a call to return (R. 32). 
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The court found that the last advice given by the 
trooper from his form (S-2) before asking him whether 
he would submit was as follows: "You will be permitted 
to have a physician of your own choice administer a 
chemical test in addition to the one I have requested 
you to submit to." To that the court said, "I can see 
how somebody could see that that's a right and you 
have the right to wait for that, unless it's further ex-
plained, and as such if he is not given that right, I can 
see how he could rationalize'' (R. 48). 
Thereafter, the court found that it was not a refusal 
on the part of the respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE FINDINGS MADE BY THE TRIAL 
COURT AND ORDER ARE NOT JUSTI-
FIED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
According to the record, Trooper Wilkinson arrested 
the respondent on probable cause for driving under the 
influence of alcohol. The record further contains invita-
tions from Trooper Wilkinson to take and submit to a 
chemical test on three occasions. The first, at the scene 
to which the respondent indicated he would take a blood 
test. The second and third requests were at the jai when 
the toooper asked him to take again the blood test and 
he indicated he wanted his doctor present. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
The third request was to take a breathalyzer test 
after both the trooper and the respondent were aware 
that his personal physician was not on call and unavail-
able to come, and that his personal physician's brother, 
a person in the same clinic was unacceptable to respon-
dent as qualifying as his physician, for reasons personal 
to the respondent only. The respondent did not further 
denote any other physician which he would call or which 
he requested the trooper to call. The respondent did not 
evidence any confusion as to his rights. The only thing 
that occurred at trial was the expression of respondent 
that he did not feel that the trooper was an impartial 
witness and therefore gave that as his reason why he 
would not take the breathalyzer test, which was the 
third offer made by the Trooper. There is no dispute in 
the facts or evidence that he did refuse to take a breath-
alyzer test at the jail at approximately 2:15 o'clock a.m. 
at a time just prior to Trooper Wilkinson leaving the 
jail. 
The Court found that there was not a refusal. The 
evidence does not support this finding. 
The question has been long settled that when the 
officer requests a chemical test and the driver responds 
with "no" that that is a refusal. Commonwealth v. Cheek, 
451 S. W. 2d 394 (Ky. 1970). Maxted v. Department of 
Motor Vehicles, 14 Cal. App. 3d 982, 92 Cal. Rptr. 579 
(1971). Should a person in respondent's position say 
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"I am not taking a test/' that has likewise been ruled as 
a refusal. Sidler v. Strelecki, 98 N. J. Super. 530, 237 A. 
2d 903 (1968). 
Thee question is here raised, by implication from 
the findings and order of the court below, that this driver 
can somehow impose additional conditions or qualifica-
tions to his taking the chemical test. In the case before 
us, however, the evidence is unequivocal that the respon-
dent did agree to take a blood test, provided his own 
physician was there, but unequivocally refused to take 
a breath test when it was determined that his own physi-
cian was not available and a substitute physician standing 
it was personally unacceptable to respondent. Therefore, 
the above evidence does not support the finding of the 
trial court. 
It has been generally held that the person arrested 
cannot impose conditions on his submission to a chemical 
test. The Supreme Court of Virginia has said, "In Vir-
ginia, the consent to take a blood test is given when the 
person operates a motor vehicle. It is not a qualified 
consent and it is not a conditional consent, and therefore 
there can be no qualified refusal or conditional refusal 
to take a test." Deaner v. Commonwealtr, 210 Va. 285, 
170 S. E. 2d 199 at 204 (1969). 
In many cases a driver in respondent's position here 
have tried to impose the requirement that the doctor 
perform the test for the peace officer, or have his own 
doctor present when the test was performed. These con-
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ditions placed by the driver have generally been held to 
be a refusal. Westmoreland v. Chapman, 74 Cal. Rptr. 
363 (Cal. App. 1968); Fattis v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 
70 Cal. Rptr. 595 (Cal. App. 1968); Beales v. Dept. of 
Motor Vehicles, 76 Oai. Rptr. 662 (Cal. App. 1969); 
Wegner v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 76 Cal. Rptr. 920 (Cal. 
App. 1969); Cushman v. Tofany, 321 N. Y. S. 2d 831 
(A. D. 1971); Breslin v. Hults, 248 N. Y. S. 2d 70 (A. D. 
1964); Janson v. Fulton, 162 N. W. 2d 438 (Iowa 1968); 
Shields v. Hults, 26 A. D. 2d 971, 274 N. Y. S. 2d 760 
(1966); Sowa v. Hults, 22 A. D. 2d 730, 253 N. Y. S. 2d 
294 (1964). The law in Utah is the same. When licensed 
to drive, a driver has given his unqualified consent to a 
chemical test. Drivers thereafter arrested under circum-
stances as here set forth have the choice to submit or 
refuse, drawing the penalty of revocation. 
It cannot be denied that the respondent did initially 
consent to the taking of a sobriety test (R. 26); it is 
clear that in specifying he would take a blood test if his 
physician was there was a conditional agreement to sub-
mit to a test. There is no dispute further in the evidence 
that that agreement carried forward in time to the jail 
and reasonable efforts were made by Trooper Wilkinson 
in response to said request to obtain his personal physi-
cian. Respondent was waiting to see if they could get Dr. 
LaVere Poulsen and apparently the testimony is uncon-
troverted that Trooper Wilkinson was willing to wait 
for Dr. LaVere Poulsen to come in order to have him 
give a blood test to the respondent in addition to the one 
that would be given pursuant to the request of the officer. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
When the trooper asked if the respondent would care 
to try to get ahold of him, he responded, "If you can't 
get him!, obviously I can't get ahold of him" (R. 30). 
After that, Trooper Wilkinson said something to the 
effect that they would forget about the blood test for 
the moment and it was thereafter that the request was 
made for the breathalyzer. 
The testimony is unrebutted that the respondent 
refused the breathalyzer test. The officer's testimony was 
that the respondent said, "No I will not. No, no." The 
trooper further testified (R. 31, line 10-13) that the re-
spondent gave no qualification or reason to the officer 
at that point in time as to why he would not take the 
breath test, all he said was "no, no." 
Therefore, other than respondent's testimony on di-
rect to his counsel that he did not feel that the offijdar 
was an impartial witness, there was no evidence that 
would indicate that he was either confused or that there 
was any qualification to the refusal to the breath test, 
which was the third request by the trooper made of the 
respondent. Therefore, this evidence does not support 
the findings or the order of the lower court. 
The last question as to whether the evidence sup-
ports the finding of the trial court is as relates to the 
advice given to Mr. Gassman in relation to the Exhibit 
£-2. 
Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
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amended, sate forth at paragraph (g) the following lan-
guage: 
" (g) The person tested shall be permitted 
to have a physician of his own choosing admin-
ister a cfoemiical test in addition to the one ad-
imnistered at the direction of the peace officer/' 
This subsection (g) does not give any parameters as 
to whether said respondent has the right to have the 
physician present at the time of the initial test or whether 
it can be done at a time or place different 
It is submitted by appellant that a fair reading of 
paragraph (g) would indicate that a physician of re-
spondent's choice could administer a test in addition 
to either the breathalyzer or the blood test inasmuch 
as the statute states "the one administered at the direc-
tion of the peace officer." 
Further, paragraph (e) stipulates that on the re-
quest of the one tested, the respondent in the case here, 
the results of the test shall be made available to the 
respondent. 
Paragraph (a) of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 
(1953), as amended, in the last sentence, states: 
"The arresting officer shall determine within 
reason which of the aforesaid tests shall be ad-
ministered." 
In the situation before the trial court, the evidence, again, 
is unrebutted that the trooper had abandoned the blood 
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test and requested a breath test. This power to desig-
nate within reason is the prerogative by statute of the 
peace officer, in this case, Trooper Wilkinson. Both par-
ties to this matter, Trooper Wilkinson and respondent, 
Mr. Gassman, were aware that his personal physician 
was unavailable and therefore it was reasonable for the 
trooper to ask him to take the alternate test, the breath-
alyzer. Mr. Gassman was clear that he assumed the 
trooper was going to administer the test (R. 45). The 
evidence is further unrebutted that an unequivocal "no" 
was given by the respondent to the taking of such test 
(R. 30, 37, 38). 
The evidence is further unrebutted that respondent 
was on notice that the availability of his own physician 
to take an additional test was in addition (emphasis 
ours) not in lieu of (emphasis ours) the test as required 
under the statute (R. 36). 
Appellant respectfully submits under the above facts 
that the evidence adduced at trial do not support the 
findings and order as set forth by the trial court. 
POINT II. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE SOBRIETY 
TEST UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-
44.10 (1953), AS AMENDED, WAS MADE 
AVAILABLE TO RESPONDENT FOR A 
REASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME AND 
THE OFFICER CAN RESPOND WITH A 
REFUSAL AFFIDAVIT WHERE WITHIN 
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THAT LENGTH OF TIME HE REASON-
ABLY CONCLUDES THAT THE RESPON-
DENT HAS CHANGED HIS MIND FROM 
A WILLINGNESS TO SUBMIT TO A TEST 
TO AN UNWILLINGNESS TO DO SO. 
The case at bar is somewhat the opposite of the 
Hunter v. Dorius case, 23 Utah 2d 122, 456 P. 2d 877 
(1969). In that case Dr. Hunter during a portion of 
his time refused to take the test and then subsequently 
changed his mind under carcumstances where this Hon-
orable Oourt, concluded that it was within a reasonable 
period of time and that the time period was such that 
Dr. Hunter could change his mind. 
In the case before the Court, it is a circumstance 
where the respondent agreed to take the test and sub-
sequently thereafter changed his mind and refused to 
submit to an alternate test, to-wit, the breathalyzer. 
Appellant submits that at that point in time the 
officer was not, within the pfrerogative of his responsibili-
ties, obligated to force a chemical test upon the respon-
dent. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953) as amended, 
subsection (c) provides in part: 
"(c) If such person has been placed under 
arrest and has thereafter been requested to sub-
mit to any one of the chemical tests provided 
for in subsection (a) or (b) of this section and 
refuses to submit to such chemical test, the test 
shall not be given and the arresting officer shall 
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shall advise the person of his rights under this 
section." (Emphasis ours.) 
The statute does not indicate that an officer in 
Trooper Wilkinson's position is required only to offer 
a single test, nor does the statute state that once a consent 
to one test is given and the same cannot, for whatever 
reason occurs, be administered, that a refusal to an alter-
nate test would not thereafter be binding. The statute 
merely states that if a person refuses, to any one of the 
chemical tests (emphasis ours) the test shall not be 
given. As in the Hunter case, if a person can change his 
mind after he learns of the consequences of his action, 
there being nothing in the statute precluding a person 
from changing his mind and submitting to a test once 
he has previously refused, the alternative is likewise true 
that having said he would consent to a test, there is 
nothing that precludes the respondent from changing his 
mind and refusing a test as appellant alleges occurred 
here. 
The state and the individual have a valid interest 
in objectively determining the level of alcohol in a driv-
er's bloodstream. This true for the purposes of better 
law enforcement and also in order to protect fully the 
rights of arrested drivers. The state should make these 
chemical tests available so that they might provide what-
ever probative value they reveal, equally beneficial to 
the respondent in a case for exoneration, as also perhaps 
could be utilized for implication. 
The fact that respondent, after agreeing to a test 
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and the conditions subsequent to that agreement being 
unfulfilled, (that is, not being able to obtain his personal 
physician), and thereafter unequivocally refusing the 
breathalyzer test, it was the officer's duty to not so ad-
minister the test and to respect respondent's answer. 
There is nothing in the statute that requires the officer 
at that point without some affirmative action by respon-
dent to obtain other physician or meet any conditions not 
reasonable under the circumstances. The duty, if any, 
was certainly upon the respondent to fulfill his condi-
tions, imposed by himself, and agreed to by Trooper Wil-
kinson, to find alternative persons just as the duty would 
be affirmatively upon the respondent in analogous cir-
cumstances to find an alternate attorney if the one he 
had asked to consult was unavailable, and he and the 
officer had taken reasonable time and efforts to obtain 
his personal attorney to consult with, prior to taking 
the test. 
Appellant asserts that this court is aware that most 
states hold that there is no right to consult an attorney 
before submitting to a chemical test or having one pres-
ent for the taking of a chemical test. That position is 
modified within this jurisdiction by Hunter v. Dorius. 
However, the Court did not state specifically under the 
Hunter case that one in respondent's position, had an 
absolute right to counsel, but expressed that it was the 
law of this jurisdiction, under those ciixmmstances, that 
were a person in respondent's position to request an 
attorney and that request was asceded to by one in 
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Trooper Wilkinson's position, that a reasonable effort 
should be made and that when the officer did agree to 
permit the contact of an attorney prior to the taking of 
a test that was a right then existing by the arrested 
drivecr. The Hunter case further states that thereafter 
there should be a reasonable time in which to obtain 
such an attorney and, a reasonable time after such con-
tact within which the arrested driver could make up his 
mind to take or to not submit to a chemical test. 
By analogy, in the Hunter case, as it applies to the 
statute and interprets the same, the same spirit of in-
teapretation would apply in the case at bar. 
By analogy, the Hunter case, Hunter v. Dorius, 23 
Utah 2d 122, should not be expanded imreasonably to 
cover cases where the arrested party either cannot find 
his physician or the arrest party voluntarily gives up 
trying to contact a physician; or as in this case, contacts 
his phyiscian's answering service, finds him unavailable, 
also, his substitute an unacceptable (emphasis ours), but 
suspends a decision he (emphasis ours) must necessarily 
make, within a reasonable time, until he can see his 
physician, which time may well be so far removed from 
time of arrest as to invalidate any results then obtainable 
by chemical test. 
Specifically, appellant argues that when as provided 
by the statute, and the advice given to the respondent 
herein that he could have a physician of his own choice 
administer a chemical test in addition to the one the 
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officer was requesting, and as here, the respondent wanted 
a blood test, it follows that the peace officer should grant 
the right for respondent to contact his personal physi-
cian and should grant a reasonable time for said personal 
physician to locate himself at the place where the test 
the officer has specified would be administered. In the 
case before us, the respondent had specifically requested 
a blood test, had asked that his physician administer it, 
the respondent was advised clearly and the testimony 
was unrebutted at trial that he could have his personal 
physician administer the test but that it would be in 
addition to, not instead of, a test requested by the offi-
cer, and one could only assume that he was agreeable 
to a Wood test for Mr. Gassman. 
It would further follow then that when it was ap-
apparent that his personal physician was not available, 
his substitute on duty was not agreeable to the respon-
dent, Trooper Wilkinson could only conclude that the 
taking of a blood test, absent any further request by Mr. 
Gassman for some other physician, was not within reason 
at that point in time. Therefore, the request of the 
Trooper to take the breathalyzer was a reasonable re-
quest under the circumstances. 
Respondent's unequivocal refusal to take a breath-
alyzer test without any renewal of his request for a phy-
sician or without a renewal of any other qiialiification 
or stipulations could only be concluded by reasonable 
men to be a refusal, by appellant herein denoted as a 
direct refusal. See Maxsted, supra. 
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Also in that regard, the Lampman case, Lampman 
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 28 Cal. App. 3d 922, 
105 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1973), sets forth even stricter inter-
pretations in a California recent decision in addition to 
the case of a flat no in the Maxsted case, and a case of 
silence in the Lampman case. Both held refusals. 
Further, the recent decision in McCall v. Dorius, 
Utah 2d , 527 P. 2d 647 (1974), makes it clear 
that in the case at bar, as it was in the McCall case, 
where there was no confusion, and the respondent, Mr. 
Gassman, refused to take the test, and he understood 
the consequences of loss of driver's license as a result 
thereof, and there was no stated confusion on his part 
at all except for the comment that he thought the Trooper 
was not an impartial witness, a loss of license would 
occur. 
CONCLUSION 
It is appellant's position that the findings and order 
of the trial court were not justified by the evidence at 
trial. It is further appellant's position that the officer 
acted reasonably in all respects and that the respondent 
was not confused and that he had the affirmative duty, 
in not being able to obtain his own physician, to either 
obtain an alternate physician or in the alternative to 
agree to take the breathalyzer test or suffer the conse-
quence of loss of license for the failure to take either 
of the two tests at that point in time, and that the re-
spondent's failure to take the test alter an arrest upon 
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probable cause, and proper advice of rights, without any 
explanation or further conditions, left the affirmative 
duty with Trooper Wilkinson, upon a direct refusal, of 
not administering the test and advising him of his rights. 
All of the above which was accomplished, therefore the 
trial court erred in reversing the administrative revoca-
tion, and the case should be reversed and remanded for 
the trial court to be instructed to revoke plaintiff's driv-
er's license as required by law for the period of one year. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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